ation
the evidence in his own declaration, on this day, of his becoming
sectional too. I see it rapidly approaching. Whatever may be the result
of this ephemeral contest between Judge Douglas and myself, I see the
day rapidly approaching when his pill of sectionalism, which he has been
thrusting down the throats of Republicans for years past, will be crowded
down his own throat.

Now, in regard to what Judge Douglas said (in the beginning of his speech)
about the Compromise of 1850 containing the principles of the Nebraska
Bill, although I have often presented my views upon that subject, yet as
I have not done so in this canvass, I will, if you please, detain you a
little with them. I have always maintained, so far as I was able, that
there was nothing of the principle of the Nebraska Bill in the Compromise
of 1850 at all,--nothing whatever. Where can you find the principle of the
Nebraska Bill in that Compromise? If anywhere, in the two pieces of the
Compromise organizing the Territories of New Mexico and Utah. It was
expressly provided in these two acts that when they came to be admitted
into the Union they should be admitted with or without slavery, as they
should choose, by their own constitutions. Nothing was said in either of
those acts as to what was to be done in relation to slavery during the
Territorial existence of those Territories, while Henry Clay constantly
made the declaration (Judge Douglas recognizing him as a leader) that, in
his opinion, the old Mexican laws would control that question during the
Territorial existence, and that these old Mexican laws excluded slavery.
How can that be used as a principle for declaring that during the
Territorial existence as well as at the time of framing the constitution
the people, if you please, might have slaves if they wanted them? I am not
discussing the question whether it is right or wrong; but how are the New
Mexican and Utah laws patterns for the Nebraska Bill? I maintain that the
organization of Utah and New Mexico did not establish a general principle
at all. It had no feature of establishing a general principle. The acts to
which I have referred were a part of a general system of Compromises.
They did not lay down what was proposed as a regular policy for the
Territories, only an agreement in this particular case to do in that way,
because other things were done that were to be a compensation for it. They
were allowed to come in in that shape, because in a