reme law of the land;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
The essence of the Dred Scott case is compressed into the sentence which I
will now read:
"Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon
a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and
expressly affirmed in the Constitution."
I repeat it, "The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
affirmed in the Constitution"! What is it to be "affirmed" in the
Constitution? Made firm in the Constitution, so made that it cannot be
separated from the Constitution without breaking the Constitution; durable
as the Constitution, and part of the Constitution. Now, remembering the
provision of the Constitution which I have read--affirming that that
instrument is the supreme law of the land; that the judges of every State
shall be bound by it, any law or constitution of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding; that the right of property in a slave is affirmed in
that Constitution, is made, formed into, and cannot be separated from
it without breaking it; durable as the instrument; part of the
instrument;--what follows as a short and even syllogistic argument from
it? I think it follows, and I submit to the consideration of men capable
of arguing whether, as I state it, in syllogistic form, the argument has
any fault in it:
Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United
States.
The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in
the Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy
the right of property in a slave.
I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument; assuming the
truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have capacity at all to
understand it, follows inevitably. There is a fault in it as I think, but
the fault is not in the reasoning; but the falsehood in fact is a fault
of the premises. I believe that the right of property in a slave is not
distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, and Judge Douglas
thinks it is. I believe that the Supreme Court and the advocates of that
decision may search in vain for the place in the Constitution where the
right of property in a slave is distinctly and expres
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