e than I intended
to do on that topic, I pass over it.

At Galesburgh, I tried to show that by the Dred Scott decision, pushed
to its legitimate consequences, slavery would be established in all the
States as well as in the Territories. I did this because, upon a former
occasion, I had asked Judge Douglas whether, if the Supreme Court should
make a decision declaring that the States had not the power to exclude
slavery from their limits, he would adopt and follow that decision as a
rule of political action; and because he had not directly answered that
question, but had merely contented himself with sneering at it, I again
introduced it, and tried to show that the conclusion that I stated
followed inevitably and logically from the proposition already decided
by the court. Judge Douglas had the privilege of replying to me at
Galesburgh, and again he gave me no direct answer as to whether he would
or would not sustain such a decision if made. I give him his third chance
to say yes or no. He is not obliged to do either, probably he will not do
either; but I give him the third chance. I tried to show then that this
result, this conclusion, inevitably followed from the point already
decided by the court. The Judge, in his reply, again sneers at the thought
of the court making any such decision, and in the course of his remarks
upon this subject uses the language which I will now read. Speaking of me,
the Judge says:

"He goes on and insists that the Dred Scott decision would carry slavery
into the free States, notwithstanding the decision itself says the
contrary." And he adds:

"Mr. Lincoln knows that there is no member of the Supreme Court that holds
that doctrine. He knows that every one of them in their opinions held the
reverse."

I especially introduce this subject again for the purpose of saying that
I have the Dred Scott decision here, and I will thank Judge Douglas to lay
his finger upon the place in the entire opinions of the court where any
one of them "says the contrary." It is very hard to affirm a negative with
entire confidence. I say, however, that I have examined that decision with
a good deal of care, as a lawyer examines a decision and, so far as I have
been able to do so, the court has nowhere in its opinions said that
the States have the power to exclude slavery, nor have they used other
language substantially that, I also say, so far as I can find, not one of
the concurring judges has said that the