certain clause of the Constitution. I
stated that, without making any complaint of it at all. I then went on and
stated the other points decided in the case; namely, that the bringing
of a negro into the State of Illinois and holding him in slavery for two
years here was a matter in regard to which they would not decide whether
it would make him free or not; that they decided the further point that
taking him into a United States Territory where slavery was prohibited by
Act of Congress did not make him free, because that Act of Congress, as
they held, was unconstitutional. I mentioned these three things as making
up the points decided in that case. I mentioned them in a lump, taken in
connection with the introduction of the Nebraska Bill, and the amendment
of Chase, offered at the time, declaratory of the right of the people of
the Territories to exclude slavery, which was voted down by the friends
of the bill. I mentioned all these things together, as evidence tending
to prove a combination and conspiracy to make the institution of slavery
national. In that connection and in that way I mentioned the decision on
the point that a negro could not be a citizen, and in no other connection.

Out of this Judge Douglas builds up his beautiful fabrication of my
purpose to introduce a perfect social and political equality between the
white and black races. His assertion that I made an "especial objection"
(that is his exact language) to the decision on this account is untrue in
point of fact.

Now, while I am upon this subject, and as Henry Clay has been alluded to,
I desire to place myself, in connection with Mr. Clay, as nearly right
before this people as may be. I am quite aware what the Judge's object
is here by all these allusions. He knows that we are before an audience
having strong sympathies southward, by relationship, place of birth, and
so on. He desires to place me in an extremely Abolition attitude. He read
upon a former occasion, and alludes, without reading, to-day to a portion
of a speech which I delivered in Chicago. In his quotations from that
speech, as he has made them upon former occasions, the extracts were taken
in such a way as, I suppose, brings them within the definition of what
is called garbling,--taking portions of a speech which, when taken by
themselves, do not present the entire sense of the speaker as expressed at
the time. I propose, therefore, out of that same speech, to show how
one portion o