nother way it was paid
for, considering that as a part of that system of measures called the
Compromise of 1850, which finally included half-a-dozen acts. It included
the admission of California as a free State, which was kept out of the
Union for half a year because it had formed a free constitution. It
included the settlement of the boundary of Texas, which had been undefined
before, which was in itself a slavery question; for if you pushed the line
farther west, you made Texas larger, and made more slave territory;
while, if you drew the line toward the east, you narrowed the boundary and
diminished the domain of slavery, and by so much increased free territory.
It included the abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia.
It included the passage of a new Fugitive Slave law. All these things were
put together, and, though passed in separate acts, were nevertheless, in
legislation (as the speeches at the time will show), made to depend upon
each other. Each got votes with the understanding that the other measures
were to pass, and by this system of compromise, in that series of
measures, those two bills--the New Mexico and Utah bills--were passed: and
I say for that reason they could not be taken as models, framed upon
their own intrinsic principle, for all future Territories. And I have the
evidence of this in the fact that Judge Douglas, a year afterward, or more
than a year afterward, perhaps, when he first introduced bills for the
purpose of framing new Territories, did not attempt to follow these bills
of New Mexico and Utah; and even when he introduced this Nebraska Bill, I
think you will discover that he did not exactly follow them. But I do not
wish to dwell at great length upon this branch of the discussion. My own
opinion is, that a thorough investigation will show most plainly that the
New Mexico and Utah bills were part of a system of compromise, and not
designed as patterns for future Territorial legislation; and that this
Nebraska Bill did not follow them as a pattern at all.

The Judge tells, in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any odious
distinctions between free and slave States. I am altogether unaware that
the Republicans are in favor of making any odious distinctions between the
free and slave States. But there is still a difference, I think, between
Judge Douglas and the Republicans in this. I suppose that the real
difference between Judge Douglas and his friends, and the Republi