ost trustworthy hands, but has
left its whole executory system to be disposed of agreeably to the
uncontrolled pleasure of any one man, however excellent or virtuous, is a
plan of polity defective not only in that member, but consequentially
erroneous in every part of it.

In arbitrary Governments, the constitution of the Ministry follows the
constitution of the Legislature. Both the Law and the Magistrate are the
creatures of Will. It must be so. Nothing, indeed, will appear more
certain, on any tolerable consideration of this matter, than that _every
sort of Government ought to have its Administration correspondent to its
Legislature_. If it should be otherwise, things must fall into a hideous
disorder. The people of a free Commonwealth, who have taken such care
that their laws should be the result of general consent, cannot be so
senseless as to suffer their executory system to be composed of persons
on whom they have no dependence, and whom no proofs of the public love
and confidence have recommended to those powers, upon the use of which
the very being of the State depends.

The popular election of magistrates, and popular disposition of rewards
and honours, is one of the first advantages of a free State. Without it,
or something equivalent to it, perhaps the people cannot long enjoy the
substance of freedom; certainly none of the vivifying energy of good
Government. The frame of our Commonwealth did not admit of such an
actual election: but it provided as well, and (while the spirit of the
constitution is preserved) better, for all the effects of it, than by the
method of suffrage in any democratic State whatsoever. It had always,
until of late, been held the first duty of Parliament _to refuse to
support Government_, _until power was in the hands of persons who were
acceptable to the people_, _or while factions predominated in the Court
in which the nation had no confidence_. Thus all the good effects of
popular election were supposed to be secured to us, without the mischiefs
attending on perpetual intrigue, and a distinct canvass for every
particular office throughout the body of the people. This was the most
noble and refined part of our constitution. The people, by their
representatives and grandees, were intrusted with a deliberative power in
making laws; the King with the control of his negative. The King was
intrusted with the deliberative choice and the election to office; the
people had the