his will be necessary upon a plan either of longer or shorter duration
of Parliament. But nothing can so perfectly remove the evil, as not to
render such contentions, foot frequently repeated, utterly ruinous, first
to independence of fortune, and then to independence of spirit. As I am
only giving an opinion on this point, and not at all debating it in an
adverse line, I hope I may be excused in another observation. With great
truth I may aver that I never remember to have talked on this subject
with any man much conversant with public business who considered short
Parliaments as a real improvement of the Constitution. Gentlemen, warm
in a popular cause, are ready enough to attribute all the declarations of
such persons to corrupt motives. But the habit of affairs, if, on one
hand, it tends to corrupt the mind, furnishes it, on the other, with the,
means of better information. The authority of such persons will always
have some weight. It may stand upon a par with the speculations of those
who are less practised in business; and who, with perhaps purer
intentions, have not so effectual means of judging. It is besides an
effect of vulgar and puerile malignity to imagine that every Statesman is
of course corrupt: and that his opinion, upon every constitutional point,
is solely formed upon some sinister interest.

The next favourite remedy is a Place-bill. The same principle guides in
both: I mean the opinion which is entertained by many of the
infallibility of laws and regulations, in the cure of public distempers.
Without being as unreasonably doubtful as many are unwisely confident, I
will only say, that this also is a matter very well worthy of serious and
mature reflection. It is not easy to foresee what the effect would be of
disconnecting with Parliament, the greatest part of those who hold civil
employments, and of such mighty and important bodies as the military and
naval establishments. It were better, perhaps, that they should have a
corrupt interest in the forms of the constitution, than they should have
none at all. This is a question altogether different from the
disqualification of a particular description of Revenue Officers from
seats in Parliament; or, perhaps, of all the lower sorts of them from
votes in elections. In the former case, only the few are affected; in
the latter, only the inconsiderable. But a great official, a great
professional, a great military and naval interest, all necessa