of being extracted from the material by analysis. Further,
this new account of knowledge does not replace the others, but is
placed side by side with them. For, according to Kant, there exist
_both_ the activity of thought which relates two conceptions in a
judgement,[9] _and_ the activity by which it introduces a unity of its
own into a manifold of perception. Nevertheless, this new account of
knowledge, or rather this account of a new kind of knowledge, must be
the important one; for it is only the process now described for the
first time which produces synthetic as opposed to analytic knowledge.

[6] Cf. A. 97, Mah. 193, 'Knowledge is a totality of compared
and connected representations.'

[7] No doubt Kant would allow that at least some categories,
e. g. the conception of cause and effect, are principles of
synthesis of a manifold which at any rate contains an
empirical element, but it _includes_ just one of the
difficulties of the passage that it implies that _a priori_
knowledge either is, or involves, a synthesis of pure or _a
priori_ elements.

[8] B. 92-4, M. 56-8.

[9] Kant, of course, thinks of this activity of thought,
as identical with that which brings particulars under a
conception.

In the second place, the passage incidentally explains why, according
to Kant, the forms of judgement distinguished by Formal Logic do not
involve the categories.[10] For its doctrine is that while thought, if
exercised under the conditions under which it is studied by Formal
Logic, can only analyse the manifold given to it, and so has, as it
were, to borrow from the manifold the unity through which it relates
the manifold,[11] yet if an _a priori_ manifold be given to it, it can
by means of a conception introduce into the manifold a unity of its
own which could not be discovered by analysis of the manifold. Thus
thought as studied by Formal Logic merely analyses and consequently
does not and cannot make use of conceptions of its own; it can use
conceptions of its own only when an _a priori_ manifold is given to it
to deal with.

[10] Cf. pp. 155-6.

[11] In bringing perceptions under a conception, thought,
according to Kant, finds the conception _in_ the perceptions
by analysis of them, and in relating two conceptions in
judgement, it determines the particular form of judgement by
analysis of the conceptions.

In the third place, there is