victories. Nor could he foresee the advantages which he would derive
from the resources of guerilla warfare, the mutual jealousies of the
French marshals, and the sudden recall of the best French troops for
service in Germany and Russia. But his prescient and practical mind
firmly grasped the dominant facts of the position--that Portugal,
guarded by the ocean on the west and by mountain ranges on the east, was
far more accessible to the British navy than to the French army; that,
under British officers, its troops might be trained into an effective
force; and that, with it as a basis, Great Britain might ultimately
liberate the whole Peninsula. "I have always been of opinion," Wellesley
said in this memorandum, "that Portugal might be defended, whatever
might be the result of the contest in Spain; and that in the meantime
the measures adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly useful
to the Spaniards in their contest with the French." On this simple
principle all his detailed recommendations were founded, and he
expressed a deliberate belief that, if 30,000 British troops were
supported by an equal number of Portuguese regulars, and a reserve of
militia was provided, "the French would not be able to overrun Portugal
with less than 100,000 men". This forecast was verified, and upon its
essential wisdom the fate of the Peninsular war, with all its
consequences, may be said to have depended.[44]

Wellesley landed at Lisbon on April 22, and was received with the utmost
demonstrations of joy and confidence. He found not only the capital but
the whole country in a state of tumult, if not of anarchy, due to a
growing despair of the national cause. His arrival rekindled the embers
of patriotism, and on May 5 he reviewed at Coimbra a body of troops
consisting of 17,000 British and Germans, with about 8,000 Portuguese.
The next day he marched towards the Douro, and on the 14th he effected
the passage of that river in the face of the French army occupying
Oporto, which the British forthwith recaptured. Soult beat a hasty and
disorderly retreat into Galicia. Having driven Soult out of Portugal,
the British general was encouraged to undertake a further advance into
Spain, where Joseph with Victor and Sebastiani had collected a much
larger army to bar the approaches to Madrid than Wellesley, relying on
Spanish intelligence, had been led to expect. During June and the first
days of July, he moved by Abrantes and the Tagus vall