gained the ground, but
the Russians made good their retreat, and six days later Kutuzov retired
through the streets of Moscow, taking the better part of the population
and all the military stores with him. The French vanguard entered on the
14th, and Napoleon himself next day. A fire, kindled either by accident
or by Russian incendiaries, raged from the 14th to the 20th and
destroyed three-fourths of the city.
[Pageheading: _NAPOLEON'S RETREAT FROM MOSCOW._]
The capture of Moscow was far from being the triumph that the French
emperor had anticipated. Deceived by his recollections of Tilsit, he had
fully counted upon receiving pacific overtures from Alexander or at
least upon his eager acceptance of conciliatory assurances from himself.
But as the weeks passed and the vision of negotiation with the Russians
proved illusory, retreat became inevitable. On the night of October 18
the French army, now about 115,000 strong, evacuated Moscow. Kutuzov,
who was stronger in cavalry, though perhaps still weaker in infantry,
hung upon its rear, and, while avoiding a pitched battle, was able to
prevent Napoleon from retreating by any other route than the now
devastated line of his advance. It has often been questioned whether
Kutuzov did not deliberately refrain from destroying the French army. He
certainly informed Sir Robert Wilson on one occasion that he did not
wish to drive Napoleon to extremities, lest his supremacy should go to
the power that ruled the sea. The remark may have been nothing more than
an outburst of ill-temper, but, whatever the motive, there can be no
doubt as to the policy adopted. The retreating French army suffered
terrible hardships from the cold, for which it was ill prepared. Twice
it seemed on the point of falling into the hands of the Russians; at
Krasnoe 26,000 prisoners are said to have been captured by Kutuzov's
army, while at Borisov the southern army under Chichagov and the army
returning from Finland under Wittgenstein joined hands, and disputed the
French passage of the Berezina on November 26-29. According to
Chambray's calculation, the French army numbered 31,000 combatants
before the passage, of whom but 9,000 remained on December 1. All the
non-combatants had been left in the hands of the enemy.
This was the last direct attack made by the Russians on the relics of
the grand army. But the worst ravages of the Russian winter had yet to
come. On December 3 the cold became intense. As the s
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