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oleon's domination, and his truly heroic constancy in striving to realise his own idea will ever constitute his best claim to greatness. No other man in England or in Europe discerned as he did, that with Portugal independent and guarded by the power of Great Britain on its western coast and its eastern frontier, the permanent conquest of Spain by the French would become impossible. No one else saw beforehand, what Napoleon discovered too late, that a war in Portugal and Spain would drain the life-blood of his invincible hosts, and at length help towards the invasion of France itself. No other general would have shown equal statesmanship in managing Spanish juntas and controlling even Spanish guerillas, or equal forbearance in sparing the French people the evils which a victorious army might have inflicted upon them. FOOTNOTES: [42] Napier, _Peninsular War_ (3rd edition), i., 123. [43] For Moore's campaign see Napier, _Peninsular War_, i., pp. xxi.-xxv., lvii.-lxxvi., 330-44, 431-542, and Oman, _Peninsular War_, i., 486-602; and compare Moore's _Diary_, edited by Maurice, ii., 272-398. Sir F. Maurice has not completely answered Professor Oman's criticisms. [44] Wellington, _Dispatches_, iv., 261-63 (March 7, 1809). [45] For the exact figures see Oman, _Peninsular War_, ii., 645-48. [46] Wellington, _Dispatches_, iv., 536 (July 29, 1809). [47] For Massena's lines of march see T. J. Andrews in _English Historical Review_, xvi. (1901), 474-92. [48] The battle is picturesquely described by Napier, _Peninsular War_, iii., 536-66. See also _ibid._, pp. xxxv.-li. [49] Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii., 318-19. [50] Napier, _Peninsular War_ (first edition), v., 513. [51] Wellington, _Dispatches_, x., 473 (June 29, 1813). [52] _Ibid._, x., 519 (July 9, 1813). CHAPTER VI. THE DOWNFALL OF NAPOLEON. The war between France and Russia, publicly threatened in August, 1811,[53] was long deferred. On Russia's part the adherence to a defensive policy delayed action until France was ready. But there was another reason why the preparations for war were only slowly pushed forward. Even at the court of St. Petersburg there was a French party which retarded such preparations as committing Russia too definitely to an open rupture. On the part of France, also, delay was necessary. Though deliberately provoked by himself, the war was not alto
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