FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   34   35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46   47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58  
59   60   61   62   63   64   65   66   67   68   69   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   >>   >|  
ity; and as the science of quantity is, so far as a science can be, quite deductive, the theory of that special kind of qualities becomes so likewise. It was thus that Descartes and Clairaut made geometry, which was already partially deductive, still more so, by pointing out the correspondence between geometrical and algebraical properties. CHAPTERS V. AND VI. DEMONSTRATION AND NECESSARY TRUTHS. All sciences are based on induction; yet some, e.g. mathematics, and commonly also those branches of natural philosophy which have been made deductive through mathematics, are called Exact Sciences, and systems of Necessary Truth. Now, their necessity, and even their alleged certainty, are illusions. For the conclusions, e.g. of geometry, flow only seemingly from the definitions (since from definitions, as such, only propositions about the meaning of words can be deduced): really, they flow from an implied assumption of the existence of real things corresponding to the definitions. But, besides that the existence of such things is not actual or possible consistently with the constitution of the earth, neither can they even be _conceived_ as existing. In fact, geometrical points, lines, circles, and squares, are simply copies of those in nature, to a part alone of which we choose to _attend_; and the definitions are merely some of our first generalisations about these natural objects, which being, though equally true of all, not exactly true of any one, must, actually, when extended to cases where the error would be appreciable (e.g. to lines of perceptible breadth), be corrected by the joining to them of new propositions about the aberration. The exact correspondence, then, between the facts and those first principles of geometry which are involved in the so-called definitions, is a fiction, and is merely _supposed_. Geometry has, indeed (what Dugald Stewart did not perceive), some first principles which are true without any mixture of hypothesis, viz. the axioms, as well those which are indemonstrable (e.g. Two straight lines cannot enclose a space) as also the demonstrable ones; and so have all sciences some exactly true general propositions: e.g. Mechanics has the first law of motion. But, generally, the necessity of the conclusions in geometry consists only in their following necessarily from certain _hypotheses_, for which same reason the ancients styled the conclusions of all deductive sciences _necessary_. T
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   34   35   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46   47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58  
59   60   61   62   63   64   65   66   67   68   69   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

definitions

 
geometry
 

deductive

 
propositions
 

sciences

 

conclusions

 

called

 

things

 

existence

 

natural


mathematics

 

science

 
principles
 

correspondence

 

geometrical

 

necessity

 
breadth
 

corrected

 
joining
 

objects


generalisations
 

choose

 

attend

 

equally

 

appreciable

 

extended

 

perceptible

 

Dugald

 

Mechanics

 

motion


generally

 

general

 

enclose

 
demonstrable
 
consists
 

ancients

 

styled

 
reason
 

necessarily

 

hypotheses


straight

 

supposed

 

Geometry

 

fiction

 

involved

 
Stewart
 

axioms

 
indemonstrable
 

hypothesis

 

mixture