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are B; most C are B; this is both an A and a C; therefore it is probably a B. On the other hand, when the subsequent approximation or approximations is or are applicable only by virtue of the application of the first, this is joining two (or more) probabilities, _by way of Deduction_, which produces a _self-infirmative chain_; and the type is: Most A are B; most C are A; this is a C; therefore it is probably an A; therefore it is probably a B. As, in the former case, the probability increases at each step, so, in the latter, it progressively dwindles. It is measured by the probability arising from the first of the propositions, abated in the ratio of that arising from the subsequent; and the error of the conclusion amounts to the aggregate of the errors of all the premisses. In two classes of cases (exceptions which prove the rule) approximate can be employed in deduction as usefully as complete generalisations. Thus, first, we stop at them sometimes, from the inconvenience, not the impossibility, of going further; and, by adding provisos, we might change the approximate into an universal proposition; the sum of the provisos being then the sum of the errors liable to affect the conclusion. Secondly, they are used in Social Science with reference to masses with _absolute_ certainty, even without the addition of such provisos. Although the premisses in the Moral and Social Sciences are only probable, these sciences differ from the exact only in that we cannot decipher so many of the laws, and not in the conclusions that we do arrive at being less scientific or trustworthy. CHAPTER XXIV. THE REMAINING LAWS OF NATURE. There are, we have seen, five facts, one of which every proposition must assert, viz. Existence, Order in Place, Order in Time, Causation, and Resemblance. Causation is not fundamentally different from Coexistence and Sequence, which are the two modes of Order in Time. They have been already discussed. Of the rest, Existence, if of things in themselves, is a topic for Metaphysics, Logic regarding the existence of _phenomena_ only; and as this, when it is not perceived directly, is proved by proving that the unknown phenomenon is connected by _succession or coexistence_ with some known phenomenon, the fact of Existence is not amenable to any _peculiar_ inductive principles. There remain Resemblance and Order in Place. As for Resemblance, Locke indeed, and, in a more unqualified way, his scho
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