FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   82   83   84   85   86   87   88   89   90   91   92   93   94   95   96   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   104   105   106  
107   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   >>  
ided these are marks of many other properties, though certainly then there should be also some more obvious property to act as a mark of the unobvious ones which form the real basis. As the first principle of _natural_ classification is that the classes must be so formed that the objects composing each may have as many properties in common as possible to serve as predicates, all _kinds_ should have places among the _natural_ groups, since the common properties of _kinds_, and, therefore, the general assertions that can be made about them, are innumerable. But _kinds_ are too few to make up the whole of a classification: other classes also may be eminently _natural_, though marked out from each other only by a definite number of properties. Of neither sort of _natural_ groups is Dr. Whewell's theory _strictly_ true, viz. that every _natural_ group is not determined by definition, that is, by definite characters which can be expressed in words, but is fixed by Type. He explains that a type is an example of any class, for instance, a species of a genus, which possesses all the characters and properties of the genus in a marked way; that round this type-species are grouped all the other species, which, though deviating from it in various directions and degrees, yet are of closer affinity to it than to the centre of any other group; and that this is the reason why propositions about _natural_ groups so often state matters as being true not in all cases, but only in most. Now, there is a truth, but only a partial truth, in this doctrine. It is this: in forming _natural_ groups, species which want certain of the class-characters, some one, and others another, are classed with those (the majority) that have them all, because they are more like (that is, in fact, have more of the common characters of) that particular group than of any other. On account of the feeling of vagueness hence engendered, we certainly, in deciding if an object belong to the group, do generally (and _must_, when the classification is made expressly with a view to a special inductive enquiry) refer mentally, not as a substitute for, but in illustration of the definition of the group, to some standard specimen which has _all_ the characters well developed. But not the less, therefore, are all _natural_, equally with all artificial, groups framed with distinct reference to certain definite characters. In the case of _kinds_, a few characters are chosen as
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   82   83   84   85   86   87   88   89   90   91   92   93   94   95   96   97   98   99   100   101   102   103   104   105   106  
107   108   109   110   111   112   113   114   115   116   117   118   >>  



Top keywords:

natural

 
characters
 

properties

 
groups
 

species

 

common

 

classification

 

definite

 

marked

 

definition


classes

 

classed

 
majority
 

account

 

matters

 

propositions

 
forming
 

feeling

 
doctrine
 

partial


engendered
 

developed

 

specimen

 

standard

 

substitute

 

illustration

 

equally

 

chosen

 

reference

 

distinct


artificial

 

framed

 

mentally

 
object
 
belong
 

deciding

 

generally

 
inductive
 

enquiry

 

special


expressly

 

vagueness

 

number

 

principle

 

strictly

 
theory
 

Whewell

 
eminently
 

general

 

predicates