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II THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY CHAPTER VI METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY [Sidenote: The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem of Philosophy.] Sect. 55. The stand-point and purpose of the philosopher define his task, but they do not necessarily prearrange the division of it. That the task is a complex one, embracing many subordinate problems which must be treated _seriatim_, is attested both by the breadth of its scope and the variety of the interests from which it may be approached. But this complexity is qualified by the peculiar importance which here attaches to unity. That which lends philosophical quality to any reflection is a steadfast adherence to the ideals of inclusiveness and consistency. Hence, though the philosopher must of necessity occupy himself with subordinate problems, these cannot be completely isolated from one another, and solved successively. Perspective is his most indispensable requisite, and he has solved no problem finally until he has provided for the solution of all. His own peculiar conceptions are those which _order_ experience, and reconcile such aspects of it as other interests have distinguished. Hence the compatibility of any idea with all other ideas is the prime test of its philosophical sufficiency. On these grounds it may confidently be asserted that the work of philosophy cannot be assigned by the piece to different specialists, and then assembled. There are no special philosophical problems which can be finally solved upon their own merits. Indeed, such problems could never even be named, for in their discreteness they would cease to be philosophical. The case of _metaphysics_ and _epistemology_ affords an excellent illustration. The former of these is commonly defined as the theory of reality or of first principles, the latter as the theory of knowledge. But the most distinctive philosophical movement of the nineteenth century issues from the idea that knowing and being are identical.[150:1] The prime reality is defined as a knowing mind, and the terms of reality are interpreted as terms of a cognitive process. Ideas and logical principles _constitute_ the world. It is evident that in this Hegelian philosophy epistemology embraces metaphysics. In defining the relations of knowledge to its object, one has already defined one's fundamental philosophical conception, while _logic_, as the science of the universal necessities of thought, wil
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