the object, realism is given the form known as the
_representative theory_. This theory is due to a radical distinction
between the inner world of consciousness and the outer world of things,
whereby in knowledge the outer object requires a substitute that is
qualified to belong to the inner world. Where, on the other hand, no
specific and exclusive nature is attributed to the inner world, realism
may flourish without the representative theory. In such a case the
object would be regarded as itself capable of entering into any number
of individual experiences or of remaining outside them all, and without
on either account forfeiting its identity. This view was taken for
granted by Plato, but is elaborately defended in our own day. During the
intervening period epistemology has been largely occupied with
difficulties inherent in the representative theory, and from that
discussion there has emerged the theory of _idealism_,[175:17] the great
rival theory to that of realism.

[Sidenote: The Relation of Knowledge to its Object According to
Idealism.]

Sect. 70. The representative theory contains at least one obvious
difficulty. If the thinker be confined to his ideas, and if the reality
be at the same time beyond these ideas, how can he ever verify their
report? Indeed, what can it mean that an idea should be true of that
which belongs to a wholly different category? How under such
circumstances can that which is a part of the idea be attributed with
any certainty to the object? Once grant that you know only your ideas,
and the object reduces to an unknown _x_, which you retain to account
for the outward pointing or reference of the ideas, but which is not
missed if neglected. The obvious though radical theory of idealism is
almost inevitably the next step. Why assume that there is any object
other than the state of mind, since all positive content belongs to that
realm? The eighteenth century English philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, was
accused by his contemporaries of wilful eccentricity, and even madness,
for his boldness in accepting this argument and drawing this conclusion:

"The table I write on I say exists; that is, I see and feel
it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed;
meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it,
or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was
an odor--that is, it was smelt; there was a sound--that is, it
was heard; a