ize the unity of the world in any
terms.

[161:11] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 358.

[162:12] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 284.

[167:13] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 161. Translation by Jowett. References to
Plato are to the marginal paging.

[168:14] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, pp. 184, 187.

[171:15] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 150 B. Translation by Jowett.

[173:16] Much ambiguity attaches to the terms "realism" and "idealism"
in current usage. The first had at one time in the history of philosophy
a much narrower meaning than that which it now possesses. It was used to
apply to those who, after Plato, believed in the independent reality of
ideas, universals, or general natures. _Realists_ in this sense were
opposed to _nominalists_ and _conceptualists_. Nominalism maintained the
exclusive reality of individual substances, and reduced ideas to
particular signs having, like the _name_, a purely symbolical or
descriptive value. Conceptualism sought to unite realism and nominalism
through the conception of mind, or an individual substance whose
meanings may possess universal validity. Though this dispute was of
fundamental importance throughout the mediaeval period, the issues
involved have now been restated. Realism in the old sense will, if held,
come within the scope of the broader epistemological realism defined
above. Nominalism is covered by empirical tendencies, and conceptualism
by modern idealism.

The term _idealism_ is sometimes applied to Plato on account of his
designation of ideas as the ultimate realities. This would be a natural
use of the term, but in our own day it has become inseparably associated
with the doctrine which attributes to being a dependence upon the
activity of mind. It is of the utmost importance to keep these two
meanings clear. In the preferred sense Plato is a realist, and so
opposed to idealism.

The term _idealism_ is further confused on account of its employment in
literature and common speech to denote the control of ideals. Although
this is a kindred meaning, the student of philosophy will gain little or
no help from it, and will avoid confusion if he distinguishes the term
in its technical use and permits it in that capacity to acquire an
independent meaning.

[175:17] See _note_, p. 173.

[176:18] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Part I, Fraser's
edition, p. 259.

[176:19] To be distinguished from the religious sect which bears the
same name.

[178:20] Quoted from Profe