all things that
are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now
revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and
the ether that are separated off."[162:12]

[Sidenote: Dualism.]

Sect. 64. It is clear, furthermore, that the doctrine of Anaxagoras not
only names a distinct kind of cause, but also ascribes to it an
independence and intrinsic importance that do not belong to motion.
Whereas motion is a property of matter, intelligence is an originative
power working out purposes of its own choosing. Hence we have here to do
with a new ontology. If we construe ultimate being in terms of mind, we
have a definite substitute for the physical theories outlined above.
Such a theory is scarcely to be attributed to any Greek philosopher of
the early period; it belongs to a more sophisticated stage in the
development of thought, after the rise of the problem of epistemology.
But Anaxagoras's sharp distinction between the material of the world on
the one hand, and the author of its order and evolution on the other, is
in itself worthy of notice. It contains the germ of a recurrent
philosophical _dualism_, which differs from pluralism in that it finds
two and only two fundamental divisions of being, the physical, material,
or potential on the one hand, and the mental, formal, or ideal on the
other.

[Sidenote: The New Meaning of Monism and Pluralism.]

Sect. 65. Finally, the alternative possibilities which these
cosmological considerations introduce, bear directly upon the general
question of the interdependence of the parts of the world, a question
which has already appeared as pertinent in ontology. Monism and
pluralism now obtain a new meaning. Where the world process is informed
with some singleness of plan, as teleology proposes, the parts are
reciprocally necessary, and inseparable from the unity. Where, on the
other hand, the processes are random and reciprocally fortuitous, as
Leucippus proposes, the world as a whole is an aggregate rather than a
unity. In this way uniformity in kind of being may prevail in a world
the relations of whose parts are due to chance, while diversity in kind
of being may prevail in a world knit together by some thorough-going
plan of organization. Thus monism and pluralism are conceptions as
proper to cosmology as to ontology.

But enough has been said to demonstrate the interdependence of ontology
and cosmology, of the theory of being and the theory of di