ted in particular by
occasional interference with Korean women by the Russian soldiers. I
travelled largely throughout the northern regions in the early days of the
war, and everywhere I heard from the people during the first few weeks
nothing but expressions of friendship to the Japanese. The coolies and
farmers were friendly because they hoped that Japan would modify the
oppression of the native magistrates. A section of better-class people,
especially those who had received some foreign training, were sympathetic,
because they credited Japan's promises and had been convinced by old
experience that no far-reaching reforms could come to their land without
foreign aid.

As victory followed victory, however, the attitude of the Japanese grew
less kindly. A large number of petty tradesmen followed the army, and these
showed none of the restraint of the military. They travelled about, sword
in hand, taking what they wished and doing as they pleased. Then the army
cut down the rate of pay for coolies, and, from being overpaid, the native
labourers were forced to toil for half their ordinary earnings. The
military, too, gradually began to acquire a more domineering air.

In Seoul itself a definite line of policy was being pursued. The Korean
Government had employed a number of foreign advisers. These were steadily
eliminated; some of them were paid up for the full time of their
engagements and sent off, and others were told that their agreements would
not be renewed. Numerous Japanese advisers were brought in, and, step by
step, the administration was Japanized. This process was hastened by a
supplementary agreement concluded in August, when the Korean Emperor
practically handed the control of administrative functions over to the
Japanese. He agreed to engage a Japanese financial adviser, to reform the
currency, to reduce his army, to adopt Japanese military and educational
methods, and eventually to trust the foreign relations to Japan. One of the
first results of this new agreement was that Mr. (now Baron) Megata was
given control of the Korean finances. He quickly brought extensive and, on
the whole, admirable changes into the currency. Under the old methods,
Korean money was among the worst in the world. The famous gibe of a British
Consul in an official report, that the Korean coins might be divided into
good, good counterfeits, bad counterfeits, and counterfeits so bad that
they can only be passed off in the dark, was