orm the duties imposed upon him by the Constitution, because
those duties are enormous. A constitutional King in Europe is not merely
the executor of the law, but the execution of its provisions devolves so
completely upon him that he has the power of paralyzing its influence
if it opposes his designs. He requires the assistance of the legislative
assemblies to make the law, but those assemblies stand in need of his
aid to execute it: these two authorities cannot subsist without each
other, and the mechanism of government is stopped as soon as they are at
variance.

In America the President cannot prevent any law from being passed, nor
can he evade the obligation of enforcing it. His sincere and zealous
co-operation is no doubt useful, but it is not indispensable, in the
carrying on of public affairs. All his important acts are directly or
indirectly submitted to the legislature, and of his own free authority
he can do but little. It is therefore his weakness, and not his power,
which enables him to remain in opposition to Congress. In Europe,
harmony must reign between the Crown and the other branches of the
legislature, because a collision between them may prove serious; in
America, this harmony is not indispensable, because such a collision is
impossible.

Election Of The President

Dangers of the elective system increase in proportion to the extent of
the prerogative--This system possible in America because no powerful
executive authority is required--What circumstances are favorable to
the elective system--Why the election of the President does not cause
a deviation from the principles of the Government--Influence of the
election of the President on secondary functionaries.

The dangers of the system of election applied to the head of the
executive government of a great people have been sufficiently
exemplified by experience and by history, and the remarks I am about
to make refer to America alone. These dangers may be more or less
formidable in proportion to the place which the executive power
occupies, and to the importance it possesses in the State; and they may
vary according to the mode of election and the circumstances in which
the electors are placed. The most weighty argument against the election
of a chief magistrate is, that it offers so splendid a lure to private
ambition, and is so apt to inflame men in the pursuit of power, that
when legitimate means are wanting force may not unfrequently seize w