it, and
not for the mere benefit of the corporators; but this did not make
the corporation a public corporation. It was a private institution for
general charity. It was not distinguishable in principle from a private
donation, vested in private trustees, for a public charity, or for
a particular purpose of beneficence. And the State itself, if it had
bestowed funds upon a charity of the same nature, could not resume those
funds."]
This provision appears to me to be the most serious attack upon the
independence of the States. The rights awarded to the Federal Government
for purposes of obvious national importance are definite and easily
comprehensible; but those with which this last clause invests it are
not either clearly appreciable or accurately defined. For there are vast
numbers of political laws which influence the existence of obligations
of contracts, which may thus furnish an easy pretext for the aggressions
of the central authority.
Chapter VIII: The Federal Constitution--Part IV
Procedure Of The Federal Courts
Natural weakness of the judiciary power in confederations--Legislators
ought to strive as much as possible to bring private individuals, and
not States, before the Federal Courts--How the Americans have succeeded
in this--Direct prosecution of private individuals in the Federal
Courts--Indirect prosecution of the States which violate the laws of the
Union--The decrees of the Supreme Court enervate but do not destroy the
provincial laws.
I have shown what the privileges of the Federal courts are, and it is no
less important to point out the manner in which they are exercised. The
irresistible authority of justice in countries in which the sovereignty
in undivided is derived from the fact that the tribunals of those
countries represent the entire nation at issue with the individual
against whom their decree is directed, and the idea of power is thus
introduced to corroborate the idea of right. But this is not always
the case in countries in which the sovereignty is divided; in them the
judicial power is more frequently opposed to a fraction of the nation
than to an isolated individual, and its moral authority and physical
strength are consequently diminished. In federal States the power of
the judge is naturally decreased, and that of the justiciable parties
is augmented. The aim of the legislator in confederate States ought
therefore to be to render the position of the courts of justice
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