ontracts. *i If a citizen thinks that an obligation
of this kind is impaired by a law passed in his State, he may refuse to
obey it, and may appeal to the Federal courts. *j

[Footnote i: It is perfectly clear, says Mr. Story ("Commentaries," p.
503, or in the large edition Section 1379), that any law which enlarges,
abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties,
resulting from the stipulations in the contract, necessarily impairs it.
He gives in the same place a very long and careful definition of what is
understood by a contract in Federal jurisprudence. A grant made by the
State to a private individual, and accepted by him, is a contract, and
cannot be revoked by any future law. A charter granted by the State to
a company is a contract, and equally binding to the State as to the
grantee. The clause of the Constitution here referred to insures,
therefore, the existence of a great part of acquired rights, but not of
all. Property may legally be held, though it may not have passed into
the possessor's hands by means of a contract; and its possession is an
acquired right, not guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.]

[Footnote j: A remarkable instance of this is given by Mr. Story (p.
508, or in the large edition Section 1388): "Dartmouth College in New
Hampshire had been founded by a charter granted to certain individuals
before the American Revolution, and its trustees formed a corporation
under this charter. The legislature of New Hampshire had, without the
consent of this corporation, passed an act changing the organization of
the original provincial charter of the college, and transferring all the
rights, privileges, and franchises from the old charter trustees to new
trustees appointed under the act. The constitutionality of the act was
contested, and, after solemn arguments, it was deliberately held by
the Supreme Court that the provincial charter was a contract within
the meaning of the Constitution (Art. I. Section 10), and that the
emendatory act was utterly void, as impairing the obligation of
that charter. The college was deemed, like other colleges of private
foundation, to be a private eleemosynary institution, endowed by
its charter with a capacity to take property unconnected with the
Government. Its funds were bestowed upon the faith of the charter, and
those funds consisted entirely of private donations. It is true that the
uses were in some sense public, that is, for the general benef