y of representatives. This
mode of election rendered a majority more probable; for the fewer the
electors are, the greater is the chance of their coming to a final
decision. It also offered an additional probability of a judicious
choice. It then remained to be decided whether this right of election
was to be entrusted to a legislative body, the habitual representative
assembly of the nation, or whether an electoral assembly should be
formed for the express purpose of proceeding to the nomination of a
President. The Americans chose the latter alternative, from a belief
that the individuals who were returned to make the laws were incompetent
to represent the wishes of the nation in the election of its chief
magistrate; and that, as they are chosen for more than a year, the
constituency they represent might have changed its opinion in that time.
It was thought that if the legislature was empowered to elect the head
of the executive power, its members would, for some time before the
election, be exposed to the manoeuvres of corruption and the tricks of
intrigue; whereas the special electors would, like a jury, remain mixed
up with the crowd till the day of action, when they would appear for the
sole purpose of giving their votes.

It was therefore established that every State should name a certain
number of electors, *v who in their turn should elect the President;
and as it had been observed that the assemblies to which the choice of
a chief magistrate had been entrusted in elective countries inevitably
became the centres of passion and of cabal; that they sometimes usurped
an authority which did not belong to them; and that their proceedings,
or the uncertainty which resulted from them, were sometimes prolonged so
much as to endanger the welfare of the State, it was determined that the
electors should all vote upon the same day, without being convoked to
the same place. *w This double election rendered a majority probable,
though not certain; for it was possible that as many differences might
exist between the electors as between their constituents. In this case
it was necessary to have recourse to one of three measures; either
to appoint new electors, or to consult a second time those already
appointed, or to defer the election to another authority. The first
two of these alternatives, independently of the uncertainty of their
results, were likely to delay the final decision, and to perpetuate
an agitation which must al