n as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of
the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (A.
3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as
being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the
case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good
or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can receive
the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which
is good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil,
can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason
apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is
good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it
is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose
it as an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil.
Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that
which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through
being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe
in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the
will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the
reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something
evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were
evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the
apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,
9) that "properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not
follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also one who does not
follow false reason." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely
speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or
erring, is always evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the judgment of an erring reason is not
derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as
being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is
all truth.

Reply Obj. 2: The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known
that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the
command of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the
command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in
scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of
the emperor. In like manner if a man were to know that human reason
was dictating something contrary to God's commandment, he would not
be bound to abi