s the rule of the human will, from which the human derives
its goodness. Hence it is written (Ps. 4:6, 7): "Many say: Who
showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is
signed upon us": as though to say: "The light of our reason is able
to show us good things, and guide our will, in so far as it is the
light (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance." It is therefore evident
that the goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much
more than on human reason: and when human reason fails we must have
recourse to the Eternal Reason.

Reply Obj. 1: To one thing there are not several proximate measures;
but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other.

Reply Obj. 2: A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing
measured; a remote measure is not.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as
it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known to us
somewhat, either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its
proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation.
________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 5]

Whether the Will Is Evil When It Is at Variance with Erring Reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at
variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the
human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as
stated above (A. 4). But erring reason is not derived from the
eternal law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human
will. Therefore the will is not evil, if it be at variance with
erring reason.

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower
authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher
authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something
that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes
proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God
Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring reason
does not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance
with erring reason.

Obj. 3: Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of
malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not
reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason
err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to
do so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will
is not evil when it is at va