nfederate brigades. At length, well on in
the afternoon, three Federal divisions crowned the spur, and, driving
Longstreet's right before them, made good their footing on the ridge.
Sharpsburg was below them; the Southern infantry, outflanked and
roughly handled, was falling back in confusion upon the town; and
although Lee had assembled a group of batteries in the centre, and
regiments were hurrying from the left, disaster seemed imminent. But
strong assistance was at hand. A.P. Hill, who had forded the Potomac
and crossed the Antietam by the lower bridge, after a forced march of
seventeen miles in eight hours from Harper's Ferry,* (* Hill received
his orders at 6.30 A.M. and marched an hour later, reaching the
battle-field about 3.30 P.M.) attacked without waiting for orders,
and struck the Federals in flank with 3000 bayonets. By this
brilliant counterstroke Burnside was repulsed and the position saved.

Northern writers have laid much stress on this attack. Had Burnside
displayed more, or A.P. Hill less, energy, the Confederates, they
assert, could hardly have escaped defeat. It is certainly true that
Longstreet's four brigades had been left to bear the brunt of
Burnside's assault without further support than could be rendered by
the artillery. They were not so left, however, because it was
impossible to aid them. Jackson's and Longstreet's troops, despite
the fiery ordeal through which they had passed, were not yet
powerless, and the Confederate leaders were prepared for offensive
tactics. A sufficient force to sustain the right might have been
withdrawn from the left and centre; but Hill's approach was known,
and it was considered inadvisable to abandon all hold of the means
for a decisive counterstroke on the opposite flank. Early in the
afternoon Longstreet had given orders for an advance. Hood's
division, with full cartridge-boxes, had reappeared upon the field.
Jones' and Lawton's divisions were close behind; the batteries had
replenished their ammunition, and if Longstreet was hardly warranted
in arranging a general counter-attack on his own responsibility, he
had at least full confidence in the ability of the troops to execute
it. "It seemed probable," he says, "that by concealing our movements
under cover of the (West) wood, we could draw our columns so near to
the enemy to the front that we would have but a few rods to march to
mingle our ranks with his; that our columns, massed in goodly
numbers, and pre