ceed to Bottom's
Bridge, and the cavalry to watch the bridges below. No certain
indications of a retreat to the James River were discovered by our
forces (Magruder) on the south side of the Chickahominy, and late in
the afternoon the enemy's works were reported to be fully manned.
Below (south of) the enemy's works the country was densely wooded and
intersected by impassable swamps, at once concealing his movements
and precluding reconnaissances except by the regular roads, all of
which were strongly guarded. The bridges over the Chickahominy in
rear of the enemy were destroyed, and their reconstruction
impracticable in the presence of his whole army and powerful
batteries. We were therefore compelled to wait until his purpose
should be developed."* (* Lee's Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 pages
493 and 494.)

During the day, therefore, the Confederate army remained on the
battle-field, waiting for the game to bolt. In the evening, however,
signs of a general movement were reported in rear of the
intrenchments at Seven Pines; and as nothing had been observed by the
cavalry on the Chickahominy, Lee, rightly concluding that McClellan
was retreating to the James, issued orders for the pursuit to be
taken up the next morning.

But to intercept the enemy before he could fortify a position,
covered by the fire of his gunboats, on the banks of the James, was a
difficult operation. The situation demanded rapid marching, close
concert, and delicate manoeuvres. The Confederate army was in rear of
the Federals, and separated from them by the Chickahominy, and, to
reach the James, McClellan had only fourteen miles to cover. But the
country over which he had to pass was still more intricate, and
traversed by even fewer roads, than the district which had hitherto
been the theatre of operations. Across his line of march ran the
White Oak Swamp, bordered by thick woods and a wide morass, and
crossed by only one bridge. If he could transfer his whole army south
of this stream, without molestation, he would find himself within six
miles of his gunboats; and as his left flank was already resting on
the Swamp, it was not easy for Lee's army to prevent his passage.

But 28,000 Confederates were already south of the Chickahominy, on
the flank of McClellan's line of march, and it was certainly possible
that this force might detain the Federals until A.P. Hill,
Longstreet, and Jackson should come up. Magruder and Huger were
therefore ordere