north-east it fell gradually,
the slopes covered with wheat, standing or in shock, to the edge of
the woods, which are from eight to sixteen hundred yards distant from
the commanding crest. The base of the hill, except to the east and
south-east, was covered with dense forest; and within the forest, at
the foot of the declivity, ran a tortuous and marshy stream. The
right flank was partially protected by a long mill-dam. The left,
more open, afforded an excellent artillery position overlooking a
broad stretch of meadows, drained by a narrow stream and deep
ditches, and flanked by the fire of several gunboats. Only three
approaches, the Quaker and the river roads, and a track from the
north-west, gave access to the heights.

The reconnaissance showed that General Porter, commanding the
defence, had utilised the ground to the best advantage. A powerful
artillery, posted just in rear of the crest, swept the entire length
of the slopes, and under cover in rear were dense masses of infantry,
with a strong line of skirmishers pushed down the hill in front.

Nevertheless, despite the formidable nature of the Federal
preparations, orders were immediately issued for attack. General Lee,
who was indisposed, had instructed Longstreet to reconnoitre the
enemy's left, and to report whether attack was feasible. Jackson was
opposed to a frontal attack, preferring to turn the enemy's right.
Longstreet, however, was of a different opinion. "The spacious open,"
he says, "along Jackson's front appeared to offer a field for play of
a hundred or more guns...I thought it probable that Porter's
batteries, under the cross-fire of the Confederates' guns posted on
his left and front, could be thrown into disorder, and thus make way
for the combined assaults of the infantry. I so reported, and General
Lee ordered disposition accordingly, sending the pioneer corps to cut
a road for the right batteries."* (* From Manassas to Appomattox page
143.)

4 P.M.

It was not till four o'clock that the line of battle was formed.
Jackson was on the left, with Whiting to the left of the Quaker road,
and D.H. Hill to the right; Ewell's and Jackson's own divisions were
in reserve. Nearly half a mile beyond Jackson's right came two of
Huger's brigades, Armistead and Wright, and to Huger's left rear was
Magruder. Holmes, still on the river road, was to assail the enemy's
left. Longstreet and A.P. Hill were in reserve behind Magruder, on
the Long Bridge road