e enemy had destroyed the bridge,
and had completely blockaded the road through the Swamp by felling
trees in and across it...I ascertained that the road debouched from
the Swamp into an open field (meadow), commanded by a line of high
hills, all in cultivation and free from timber. Upon this ridge of
hills the enemy had posted heavy batteries of field-artillery,
strongly supported by infantry, which swept the meadow by a direct
and cross fire, and which could be used with terrible effect upon my
column while struggling through the fallen timber in the wood through
the Swamp." (1 O.R. volume 11 part 1 pages 810, 811.)

Having ascertained that the enemy was present in great strength on
the further bank, that every road was obstructed, and that there was
no means of carrying his artillery over the creek, or favourable
ground on which his infantry could act, Jackson gave up all hope of
aiding Longstreet.

That the obstacles which confronted him were serious there can be no
question. His smooth-bore guns, although superior in number, were
unable to beat down the fire of the rifled batteries. The enemy's
masses were well hidden. The roads were blocked, the stream was
swollen, the banks marshy, and although infantry could cross them,
the fords which had proved difficult for the cavalry would have
stopped the artillery, the ammunition waggons, and the ambulances;
while the Federal position, on the crest of a long open slope, was
exceedingly strong. Jackson, as his report shows, maturely weighed
these difficulties, and came to the conclusion that he could do no
good by sending over his infantry alone. It was essential, it is
true, to detain as many as possible of the enemy on the banks of the
Swamp, while Longstreet, Hill, Huger, and Magruder dealt with the
remainder; and this he fully realised, but it is by no means
improbable that he considered the heavy fire of his guns and the
threatening position of his infantry would have this effect.

It is interesting to note how far this hope, supposing that he
entertained it, was fulfilled. Two divisions of Federal infantry and
three batteries--a total of 22,000 men--defended the passage at White
Oak Bridge against 27,000 Confederates, including Wright; and a
detached force of infantry and guns was posted at Brackett's Ford.*

(* General Heintzleman, commanding the Federal 3rd Corps, reports
that he had placed a force at Brackett's Ford (O.R. volume 11 part 2
page 100). General S