ed by others; but, in
any case, it was imperative that D.H. Hill should be supported, and
the other divisions were ordered forward with all speed. Huger's and
Magruder's men attacked with the same determination as had been
displayed by Hill's, but no better success attended their endeavours.
The brigades were not properly formed when the order arrived, but
scattered over a wide front, and they went in piecemeal. Magruder's
losses were even greater than Hill's; and with his defeat the battle
ceased.

Had the Federals followed up the repulse with a strong counter-attack
the victory of Malvern Hill might have been more decisive than that
of Gaines' Mill. It is true that neither Longstreet nor A.P. Hill had
been engaged, and that three of Jackson's divisions, his own,
Whiting's and Ewell's, had suffered little. But Magruder and D.H.
Hill, whose commands included at least 30,000 muskets, one half of
Lee's infantry, had been completely crushed, and Holmes on the river
road was too far off to lend assistance. The fatal influence of a
continued retreat had paralysed, however, the initiative of the
Federal generals. Intent only on getting away unscathed, they
neglected, like McClellan at Gaines' Mill, to look for opportunities,
forgetting that when an enemy is pursuing in hot haste he is very apt
to expose himself. Jackson had acted otherwise at Port Republic.

The loss of over 5000 men was not the worst which had befallen the
Confederates. "The next morning by dawn," says one of Ewell's
brigadiers, "I went off to ask for orders, when I found the whole
army in the utmost disorder--thousands of straggling men were asking
every passer-by for their regiments; ambulances, waggons, and
artillery obstructing every road, and altogether, in a drenching
rain, presenting a scene of the most woeful and disheartening
confusion."* (* Trimble's Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 619.)
The reports of other officers corroborate General Trimble's
statement, and there can be no question that demoralisation had set
in. Whether, if the Federals had used their large reserves with
resolution, and, as the Confederates fell back down the slopes, had
followed with the bayonet, the demoralisation would not have
increased and spread, must remain in doubt. Not one of the Southern
generals engaged has made public his opinion. There is but one thing
certain, that with an opponent so blind to opportunity as McClellan a
strong counterstroke was the last thi