f."
"But I was successful," was Jackson's reply; as much as to say that
an officer, when he takes upon himself the responsibility of ignoring
the explicit instructions of his superior, must be morally certain
that he is doing what that superior, were he present, would approve.
Apply this rule to the situation at White Oak Swamp. For anything
Jackson knew it was possible that Longstreet and Hill might defeat
the Federals opposed to them without his aid. In such case, Lee,
believing Jackson to be still on the left flank, would have ordered
him to prevent the enemy's escape by the Long Bridge. What would Lee
have said had his "further orders" found Jackson marching to the
Charles City road, with the Long Bridge some miles in rear? The truth
is that the principle of marching to the sound of the cannon, though
always to be borne in mind, cannot be invariably followed. The only
fair criticism on Jackson's conduct is that he should have informed
Lee of his inability to force the passage across the Swamp, and have
held three divisions in readiness to march to Glendale. This, so far
as can be ascertained, was left undone, but the evidence is merely
negative.
Except for this apparent omission, it cannot be fairly said that
Jackson was in the slightest degree responsible for the failure of
the Confederate operations. If the truth be told, Lee's design was by
no means perfect. It had two serious defects. In the first place, it
depended for success on the co-operation of several converging
columns, moving over an intricate country, of which the Confederates
had neither accurate maps nor reliable information. The march of the
columns was through thick woods, which not only impeded
intercommunication, but provided the enemy with ample material for
obstructing the roads, and Jackson's line of march was barred by a
formidable obstacle in White Oak Swamp, an admirable position for a
rear-guard. In the second place, concentration at the decisive point
was not provided for. The staff proved incapable of keeping the
divisions in hand. Magruder was permitted to wander to and fro after
the fashion of D'Erlon between Quatre Bras and Ligny. Holmes was as
useless as Grouchy at Waterloo. Huger did nothing, although some of
his brigades, when the roads to the front were found to be
obstructed, might easily have been drawn off to reinforce Longstreet.
The cavalry had gone off on a raid to the White House, instead of
crossing the Chickahominy and
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