h 22,000 from a
position which the latter had selected; and it was not till King's
approach gave the Federals an overwhelming superiority that the
Confederates withdrew behind the Rapidan.

With sublime audacity, as soon as his enemy had disappeared, Pope
claimed the battle of Cedar Run as a Federal success. Carried away by
enthusiasm he ventured to forecast the future. "It is safe to
predict," he declared in a general order, "that this is only the
first of a series of victories which shall make the Army of Virginia
famous in the land." That such language, however, was the natural
result of intense relief at Jackson's retreat may be inferred from
his telegrams, which, unfortunately for his reputation, have been
preserved in the archives of Washington. Nor was his attitude on the
10th and 11th that of a victorious commander. For two days he never
stirred from his position. He informed Halleck that the enemy was in
very superior force, that Stuart and Longstreet had joined Jackson,
and while the Confederates were withdrawing he was telegraphing that
he would certainly be attacked the next morning.

Halleck's reply to Pope's final dispatch, which congratulated the
defeated army corps on a "hard-earned but brilliant success," must
have astonished Banks and his hapless troops. They might indeed be
fairly considered to have "covered themselves with glory."* (* O.R.
volume 12 part 2 page 135.) 9000 men, of which only 7000 were
infantry, had given an enemy of more than double their strength a
hard fight. They had broken some of the best troops in the
Confederate army, under their most famous leader; and if they had
been overwhelmed by numbers, they had at least fought to the last
man. Jackson himself bore witness to the vigour of their onslaught,
to their "temporary triumph," and to the "impetuous valour" of their
cavalry. The Federal defeat was more honourable than many victories.
But that it was a crushing defeat can hardly be disputed. The two
divisions which had been engaged were completely shattered, and Pope
reported that they were no longer fit for service. The casualties
amongst the infantry amounted to a third of the total strength. Of
the brigade that had driven in the Confederate left the 28th New York
lost the whole of its company officers; the 5th Connecticut 17
officers out of 20, and the 10th Maine had 170 killed or wounded. In
two brigades nearly every field-officer and every adjutant was struck
down. The 2nd