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ch lay between them was perfectly open, the roads were free, and inter-communication seemed easy in the extreme. Yet, despite their orders, despite the facilities of communication, the Guards advanced to the attack an hour and a half too soon; and from six o'clock to nearly seven their shattered lines lay in front of the position, at the mercy of a vigorous counterstroke, without a single Saxon regiment coming to their aid. But the Saxons were not to blame. Their march had been unchecked; they had moved at speed. On their part there had been no hesitation; but on the part of the commander of the Guards there had been the same precipitation which led to the premature attack on the Federal position at Beaver Dam Creek. It was the impatience of General Hill, not the tardiness of Jackson, which was the cause of the Confederate repulse. We may now turn to the question whether Jackson was justified in not marching to the sound of the cannon. Referring to General Lee's orders, it will be seen that as soon as Longstreet and D.H. Hill had crossed the Chickahominy the four divisions of the army were to move forward in communication with each other and drive the enemy from his position, Jackson, in advance upon the left, "turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction of Cold Harbour." When Jackson reached Hundley's Corner, and drove the Federal infantry behind the Creek, the first thing to do, as his orders indicated, was to get touch with the rest of the army. It was already near sunset; between Hundley's Corner and Mechanicsville lay a dense forest, with no roads in the desired direction; and it was manifestly impossible, under ordinary conditions, to do more that evening than to establish connection; the combined movement against the enemy's position must be deferred till the morning. But the sound of battle to the south-west introduced a complication. "We distinctly heard," says Jackson, "the rapid and continued discharges of cannon."* (* Jackson's Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 553.) What did this fire portend? It might proceed, as was to be inferred from Lee's orders, from the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy covering Hill's passage. It might mean a Federal counterstroke on Hill's advanced guard; or, possibly, a premature attack on the part of the Confederates. General Whiting, according to his report, thought it "indicated a severe battle."* (* Whiting's Report, O.R. volume 11 part 1 page 562.) General Trim
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