hole available strength in this battle; otherwise
their enterprise was insensate. Furthermore, it was clearly to the
interests of the Confederates to strike at his army before McDowell
could join him. They had not done so, and it was therefore probable
that they did not feel themselves strong enough to do so. It is true
that he was altogether misled by the intelligence supplied as to the
garrison of Richmond by his famous detective staff. 200,000 was the
smallest number which the chief agent would admit. But that McClellan
should have relied on the estimate of these untrained observers
rather than on the evidence furnished by the conduct of the enemy is
but a further proof that he lacked all power of deduction.* (* In one
sense McClellan was not far wrong in his estimate of the Confederate
numbers. In assuming control of the Union armies Lincoln and Stanton
made their enemies a present of at least 50,000 men.)

It may well be questioned whether he was anxious at heart to measure
swords with Lee. His knowledge of his adversary, whose reputation for
daring, for ability, for strength of purpose, had been higher than
any other in the old army, must needs have had a disturbing influence
on his judgment. Against an enemy he did not know McClellan might
have acted with resolution. Face to face with Lee, it can hardly be
doubted that the weaker will was dominated by the stronger. Vastly
different were their methods of war. McClellan made no effort
whatever either to supplement or to corroborate the information
supplied by his detectives. Since he had reached West Point his
cavalry had done little.* (* It must be admitted that his cavalry was
very weak in proportion to the other arms. On June 20 he had just
over 5000 sabres (O.R. volume 11 part 3 page 238), of which 3,000
were distributed among the army corps. The Confederates appear to
have had about 3,000, but of superior quality, familiar, more or
less, with the country, and united under one command. It is
instructive to notice how the necessity for a numerous cavalry grew
on the Federal commanders. In 1864 the Army of the Potomac was
accompanied by a cavalry corps over 13,000 strong, with 32 guns. It
is generally the case in war, even in a close country, that if the
cavalry is allowed to fall below the usual proportion of one trooper
to every six men of the other arms the army suffers.) Lee, on the
other hand, had found means to ascertain the disposition of his
adversary's