n of 1916-1918 HENDERSON H. DONALD
Book Reviews
Notes

THE JOURNAL

OF

NEGRO HISTORY

VOL. VI--JANUARY, 1921--NO. 1

FIFTY YEARS OF NEGRO CITIZENSHIP AS QUALIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT

THE HISTORIC BACKGROUND

The citizenship of the Negro in this country is a fiction. The
Constitution of the United States guarantees to him every right
vouchsafed to any individual by the most liberal democracy on the face
of the earth, but despite the unusual powers of the Federal Government
this agent of the body politic has studiously evaded the duty of
safeguarding the rights of the Negro. The Constitution confers upon
Congress the power to declare war and make peace, to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to coin money, to regulate
commerce, and the like; and further empowers Congress "to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any department or
officer thereof." After the unsuccessful effort of Virginia and
Kentucky, through their famous resolutions of 1798 drawn up by
Jefferson and Madison to interpose State authority in preventing
Congress from exercising its powers, the United States Government with
Chief Justice John Marshall as the expounder of that document, soon
brought the country around to the position of thinking that, although
the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers, that government
and not that of States is the judge of the extent of its powers and,
"though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of
action."[1] Marshall showed, too, that "there is no phrase in the
instrument which, like the Articles of Confederation, excludes
incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything
granted shall be expressly and minutely described."[2] Marshall
insisted, moreover, "that the powers given to the government imply the
ordinary means of execution," and "to imply the means necessary to an
end is generally understood as implying any means, calculated to
produce the end and not as being confined to those single means
without which the end would be entirely unattainable."[3] He said:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist