which had sustained
this statute, the Supreme Court of the United States fell back upon
various principles of interpretation. The court said it would not
disturb the judgment of the State court resting on Federal or
non-Federal grounds, if the latter was sufficient to sustain the
decision in as much as the State court determines the extent of the
limitations of powers conferred by the State on its corporations. It
directed attention to the fact that a corporation is not entitled to
all the immunities to which individuals are entitled and a State may
withhold from its corporations privileges and powers of which it
cannot constitutionally deprive individuals. A State statute limiting
the powers of corporations and individuals may be constitutional as to
the former, although unconstitutional as to the latter; and if
separable it will not be held unconstitutional in the instance of a
corporation unless it clearly appears that the legislature would not
have enacted it as to corporations separately. "The same rule,"
continues the court, "which permits separable sections of a statute to
be declared unconstitutional without rendering the entire statute void
applies to separable provisions of a section of a statute. In coming
to the assistance of the Supreme Court of Kentucky the national
tribunal said the prohibition of Kentucky against persons and
corporations maintaining schools for both white persons and Negroes is
separable and, even if an unconstitutional restraint as to
individuals, is not unconstitutional as to corporations, it being
within the power of the State to determine the powers conferred upon
its corporations.

The court conceded that the reserve power to alter, or amend charters
is subject to reasonable limitations but insisted that the Kentucky
law includes no alteration or amendment which defeats or substantially
impairs the object of the grant of vested rights. The court then went
almost out of its way to say that "a general statute which in effect
alters or amends a charter is to be construed as an amendment for all
even if not in terms so designated. The court conceded that a statute
which permits the education of both whites and Negroes at the same
time in different localities, although prohibiting their attendance in
the same place, does not defeat the object of a grant to maintain the
college for all persons and is not violative of the contract clause of
the Federal Constitution, the State law having