ion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution, may employ
such means not prohibited, as are necessary and proper, or such as are
appropriate to attain the ends proposed. The court held, moreover, in
_Prigg_ v. _Pennsylvania_, that "the fundamental principle applicable
to all cases of this sort, would seem to be, that when the end is
required the means are given; and when the duty is enjoined, the
ability to perform it is contemplated to exist on the part of the
functionaries to whom it is entrusted." It required very little
argument to expose the fallacy in supposing that the national
government had ever meant to rely for the due fulfillment of its
duties and the rights which it established, upon State legislation
rather than upon that of the United States, and with greater reason,
when one bears in mind that the execution of power which was to be the
same throughout the nation could not be confided to any State which
could not rightfully act beyond its own territorial limits. All of
this power exercised in executing the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 was
implied, rather than such direct power as that later conferred upon
Congress by the Thirteenth Amendment, which provided that Congress
should have power to pass appropriate legislation to enforce it.

As the Supreme Court decided in the case of _Prigg_ v. _Pennsylvania_
that the officers of the State were not legally obligated to assist in
the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, Congress passed
another and a more drastic measure in 1850 which, although unusually
rigid in its terms, was enthusiastically supported by the Supreme
Court in upholding the slavery regime. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850
deprived the Negro suspect of the right of a trial by jury to
determine the question of his freedom in a competent court of the
State. The affidavit of the person claiming the Negro was sufficient
evidence of ownership. This law made it the duty of marshals and of
the United States courts to obey and execute all warrants and precepts
issued under the provisions of this act. It imposed a penalty of a
fine and imprisonment upon any person knowingly hindering the arrest
of a fugitive or attempting to rescue one from custody or harboring
one or aiding one to escape. The writ of habeas corpus was denied to
the reclaimed Negro and the act was _ex post facto_. In short, the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 committed the whole country to the task of
the protection of slave property and