macher(3) in regard to religion follow the same
lines. For this is precisely what he means when he insists that the
universe must be experienced in intuition and feeling as well as in
knowing and doing. He is less incisive in his expressions than Fries, but
wider in ideas. He includes in this domain of "intuitive feeling" not only
the aesthetic experiences of the beautiful and sublime, but takes the much
more general and comprehensive view, that the receptive mind may gather
from the finite impressions of the infinite, and may through its
experiences of time gain some conception of the eternal. And he rightly
emphasises, that such intuition has its true place in the sphere of mind
and in face of the events of history, rather than in the outer court of
nature. He, too, lays stress on the fact that doctrinal statements and
ideas cannot be formulated out of such subtle material.

The experience of which we are speaking may be most directly and
impressively gained from the great, the powerful, the sublime in nature.
It may be gained from the contemplation of nature's harmonies and
beauties, but also of her overflowing abundance and her enigmatical
daemonic strength, from the purposeful intelligibility as well as the
terrifying and bewildering enigmas of nature's operations, from all the
manifold ways in which the mind is affected and startled, from all the
suggestive but indefinable sensations which may be roused in us by the
activity of nature, and which rise through a long scale to intoxicated
self-forgetfulness and wordless ecstasy before her beauty, and her
half-revealed, half-concealed mystery. If any or all of these be stirred
up in a mind which is otherwise godless or undevout, it remains an
indefinite, vacillating feeling, bringing with it nothing else. But in the
religious mind it immediately unites with what is akin to it or of similar
nature, and becomes worship. No dogmas or arguments for disputatious
reasoning can be drawn from it. It can hardly even be expressed, except,
perhaps, in music. And if it be expressed it tends easily to become
fantastic or romantic pomposity, as is shown even by certain parts of the
writings of Schleiermacher himself.

The Recognition of Purpose.

(6.) We must now turn to the question of "teleology." Only now, not
because it is a subordinate matter, for it is in reality the main one, but
because it is the culminating point, not the starting point, of our
argument. If the w