ory of
epigenesis, which Weismann wished to do away with as a mystery, is
repeated a thousand times and made more difficult. In order to explain
puzzling processes on a large scale, others have been constructed, which
on close investigation prove to be just the same mysterious and
unexplained processes, only made infinitely smaller.

Moreover, even if the whole of "Weismannism," including germinal
selection, could be accepted, and if it were as sufficient as it is
insufficient, what we advanced at the end of Chapter III. as a standpoint
of general validity in relation to teleology and theology would still hold
good. Even an entirely naive, anthropomorphic, "supernatural" theology is
ready to see, in the natural course of things, in the "_causae
secundariae,_" the realisation of Divine purpose, teleology, and does not
fail to recognise that the Divine purpose may fulfil itself not only in an
extraordinary manner, through "miracles" and "unconditioned" events, but
also in ordinary ways, "through means" and the universal causal nexus.
Thus it is quite consistent even with a theology of this kind to regard
the whole system of causes and effects, which, according to the
Darwin-Weismann doctrine, have gradually brought forth the whole diversity
of the world of life, with man at its head, in a purely causal way without
teleological intervention, as an immense system of means marvellous in its
intricacy, in the inevitable necessity of its inter-relations, and in the
exactness of its work, the ultimate result of which _must_ have come
about, but perhaps at the same time was _intended_ to come about. Whether
I regard this ultimate result as the mere consequence of blind happenings,
or as an intended purpose, does not depend, as we have seen, upon the
knowledge gained by natural science, but depends above all on whether this
ultimate result seems to me of sufficient _value_ to be thought of as the
purpose of a world-governing intelligence, and thus depends upon my
personal attitude to human nature, reason, mind, and the spiritual,
religious, and moral life. If I venture to attribute worth, and absolute
worth, to these things, nothing, not even the fact of the "struggle for
existence" in its thousand forms, in its gradually transforming effects,
in the almost endless nexus of its causes and results, germinal selection
included, can take away my right (and eventually my duty) to regard the
ultimate result _as an end_, and the nexus o