be quite neutral towards religion, or might be
purely naturalistic. It was the theory of Entelechies and _formae
substaniales_. In order to explain how a thing had come to be, it taught
that the idea of the finished thing, the "form," was implicit in it from
the very beginning, and determined the course of its development. This
"form," the end aimed at in development, was "potentially," "ideally," or
"virtually" implicit in the thing from the beginning, was the _causa
finalis_, the ultimate cause which determined the development. Modern
natural science objects to this theory that it offers no explanation, but
merely gives a name to what has to be explained. The aim of science, it
tells us, is to elucidate the play of causes which brought about a
particular result. The hypothetical _causa finalis_ it regards as a mere
_asylum ignorantiae_, and as the problem itself not as its solution. For
instance, if we inquire into the present form and aspect of the earth,
nothing is advanced by stating that the "form," the primitive model of the
evolving earth was implicit in it from the beginning, and that it
gradually determined the phases and transition-stages of its evolution,
until the ultimate state, the end aimed at, was attained. The task of
science is, through geology, geognosy, mineralogy, geodesy, physical
geography, meteorology, and other sciences to discover the physical,
chemical, and mechanical causes of the earth's evolution and their laws,
and from the co-operation of these to interpret everything in detail and
as a whole.

Whether modern natural science is right in this or not, whether or not it
has neglected an element of truth in the old theory of Entelechies which
it cannot dispense with, especially in regard to living organisms, it is
beyond dispute that, from the most general point of view, and in
particular with reference to teleology, religion does not need to concern
itself in the least about this opposition. "Purposes," "ideas," "guidance"
in the religious sense, are quite unaffected by the manner in which the
result is realised; everything depends upon the special and particular
value of what has been attained or realised. If a concatenation of causes
and stages of development lead to results in which we suddenly discern a
special and particular value, then, and not till then, have we a reason
and criterion for our assumption that it is not simply a result of a play
of chances, but that it has been brought