head; and would,
meanwhile, be exposed to enfilade. Marching _to_ a flank, it would be
running the gauntlet of the enemy's batteries and musketry fire. In
forming into line in either case, much time would be lost; as in flank
marching in the field, especially when the ground is ragged or
obstructed, distances cannot be preserved.

It may be here remarked, that marching to a flank in column also,
whether by division, company, or platoon, is highly objectionable, as it
constantly exposes the column to an enfilading fire, as well as to be
suddenly charged in flank by cavalry.

III.--The Attack, how made.

1. The speed of a column of attack must _never be checked_ for a moment,
to enable it to reply to the enemy's fire. The fire of the column will
be ineffective, for it will be the fire of excited men, and very limited
in extent, as it can proceed from the leading division only; and the
fire once begun, it will be hard to stop it. If, in order to fire, we
halt the column, re-forming it under the excitement of the fire will be
very difficult; and the enemy's least forward movement may then cause a
rout.

At Maida, in Calabria, in 1806, the French columns attacked the English
under General Stuart. When within thirty paces, the English gave them a
volley. The French, stunned, as it were, began, at once, to deploy. The
English fired again, and the French retreated.

At Waterloo, in the last grand attack by the French, the advance column
of the Imperial Guard was decisively repulsed by the British Guards.
These had been lying on the ground behind the crest of the slope until
the French appeared, when they suddenly rose up and poured in a
murderous volley at short range. Instead of instantly charging with the
bayonet, the French hesitated, then began to deploy. The British charged
at once, and drove them down the hill.

2. This dangerous halt and deployment is apt also to occur when the
column finds _sheltering objects by the way_. Therefore, hurry by these,
and hasten the step.

3. It will also tend to prevent such an untoward accident, if we furnish
the columns of attack, where several are employed, with _skirmishers_ in
their intervals, as well as on their outer flanks, to draw the enemy's
fire. Otherwise, the column fired into will be apt, in order to return
the fire, to halt instinctively and deploy into line, which breaks up
the attack.

4. From this it appears that the limited fire of a column of attack is,
in