nsequence is, that very few shots take effect, and
the fire is, for the greater part, wasted, as is shown by the
well-established fact that, in every engagement, for every man killed or
disabled, there have been from three to ten thousand musket or rifle
bullets fired.
(2.) Except on windy days, a cloud of smoke soon collects in front of a
line firing at will, hiding, more or less completely, the enemy from
view. The fire being then at random, it is, of course, unreliable.
(3.) The fire at will leads to a rapid and enormous consumption of
ammunition. To show how serious is this objection also, it is only
necessary to consider in how many instances victory has been turned into
defeat by the premature exhaustion, by one or more regiments, of their
ammunition.
(4.) As a necessary consequence of this rapid consumption of ammunition,
the pieces soon become fouled, and thus, to a great extent, useless.
(5.) Troops under a musketry fire at will, soon become accustomed to it,
and its incessant din produces on them a stunning effect, which deadens,
in no small degree, their sensibility to danger.
7. On the other hand, _volley firing_ has often been attended with
decisive results, especially when it has been reserved to the proper
moment, and delivered at short range. Instances of this have occurred in
almost every great battle we read of in history, as also in the late War
of the Rebellion. For example: at the battle of South Mountain,
Doubleday's brigade was engaged with a heavy force of rebels at some
thirty or forty paces in its front. Our men were behind a fence, firing
at will; but their fire made little or no impression on the enemy, who
attempted to charge at the least cessation of the fire. Our troops were
then made to cease firing, to lie down behind the fence, and, on the
enemy's approach to within fifteen paces, to spring up and pour in a
volley. This was so deadly, that the rebels fled in disorder, leaving
their dead and wounded, and could not be rallied again.
At Chickamauga, in 1863, the regiments of Hazen's brigade fired only by
volleys; every one of which, it is officially reported, was powerfully
effective in checking the enemy's attacks.
8. Nevertheless, it has been a common military saying, and supported
even by high authority, that the fire at will is _the only one possible
in action_. This assertion implies that the rank and file are not
sufficiently cool to reserve their fire, and that they mu
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