st be kept
constantly occupied by the excitement, noise, and smoke of their own
fire, in order to make them remain steady in their ranks under that of
the enemy.
As applied to raw, undisciplined, or demoralized troops, the proposition
may be, to a great extent, true. But in reference to disciplined or
veteran troops, whose _morale_ has not been impaired, it will be found
disproved on almost every page of military history; from which a few
examples will be cited hereafter. For the present, one instance will
suffice; that of Colonel Willich's regiment of Thirty-second Indiana
Volunteers, at the battle of Shiloh, in April, 1862. While under fire,
their commander, perceiving their own fire to have become "a little
wild," caused them to cease firing, and then drilled them in the manual
of arms, which they went through as if on parade; after which, they
again opened on the enemy a fire, which is reported to have been
"deliberate, steady, and effective."
It may be here observed that, whenever troops lose their presence of
mind, there is no surer way of restoring it than by the repetition, by
their officers, in their usual tone, of any words of command they have
learned instinctively to obey on the drill-ground.
9. Infantry, when charged in position, should reserve its fire till it
can be made _with deadly effect_, as at the distance of fifty paces; and
the volleys should be instantly followed up by a countercharge with the
bayonet on the charging enemy. For, if our fire has staggered him, a
vigorous charge will complete his repulse; and if it has not, our only
chance of success is in suddenly taking the offensive ourselves.
Whilst awaiting his charge, we shall incur but little, if any, loss
from the enemy's fire; for the fire of troops advancing to attack is
usually of very little account.
The only disadvantage attending a volley just before we charge is, that,
as the smoke veils us from the enemy's view, it will rob us, to some
extent, of the moral effect of our swift advance.
But, in many cases, if the enemy see us awaiting his bayonet attack, and
reserving our fire to the very last, he loses resolution, relaxes his
speed, and then stops short, or retires.
At Cowpens, Colonel Howard broke and routed the British line which was
advancing to attack him, by reserving his fire to within thirty yards,
and then charging with the bayonet.
At the battle of Friedland, the Russian Imperial Guard charged on
Dupont's di
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