ondly. In presence of a bold and active enemy, it would expose the
attacking troops to the danger of being charged and routed while
manoeuvring.

13. In the late War of the Rebellion, in lieu of close columns, attacks
have been sometimes made in _several lines_, following each other at
distances of three hundred paces or more. Although these attacks have
sometimes succeeded, they are objectionable in principle; for each line
is in danger of being repulsed successively, before the arrival of the
one in its rear; and there is wanting that great superiority of force at
the decisive point which is the most important element of success in a
battle.

Such formations are essentially defensive in their nature, and not
suitable for attack. A line in position, against which the enemy is
advancing, is strong in its fire, which will usually preserve it from
absolute defeat till a second line, posted at one hundred and fifty, or
even three hundred paces in its rear, has had time to come up in
support. But even these distances Napoleon's experience appears to have
taught him to be much too great; for in his last battle, at Waterloo, he
posted his second line, both infantry and cavalry, at only sixty paces
behind the first; thus sacrificing, to a great extent, the advantage of
keeping the second line out of fire, in order to secure the more
important one of concentration of force. But this was only his formation
for defence; for, in the same battle, his formations for attack were
always in close columns.

14. Our present Infantry Tactics have adopted two new expedients to
accelerate the advance of battalions, and diminish the loss to which
columns of attack are liable--Division Columns and Advancing by the
Flank of Subdivisions.

As _Division Columns_ break the battalion line into several columns,
each of two or three subdivisions deep, as a substitute for a single
column four or five subdivisions deep, they undoubtedly diminish the
loss from the enemy's artillery fire in corresponding proportion. But in
compensation for this partial advantage, they have three defects:--

(1.) In moving rapidly for any distance, especially over broken or
obstructed ground, both the alignment and the proper intervals between
the columns will usually be lost; thus causing, in the deployment, a
dangerous loss of time in re-establishing the alignment and the correct
intervals.

(2.) In advancing in line of division columns, there is no means of
fo