eavily attacked by the Turks and fell back then of
themselves into their old trenches. Another case of "as you were." We
have lost a lot of men and can only hope that the Turks have lost as
many. I don't think for a moment they did, not at least in the Suvla Bay
sphere, but Cox and Russell claim to have accounted for a very great
number of them in their first retreat and in their counter-attacks in
the Southern sector of the battle.

_23rd August, 1915. Imbros._ Not one moment, till to-day, to weigh
bearing of K.'s message of the 20th instant,--the message sent me in
reply to my appeal for 50,000 fresh troops and 45,000 drafts. In it K.
tells me that a big push is going to take place in the Western theatre,
and that I "must understand that no reinforcements of importance can be
diverted from the main theatre of operations in France." Certain named
transports are carrying, he says, more troops to Egypt, and he hopes
Maxwell will be able to spare me some. If we can't get through with
these we must hang on as best we may.

To-day it has been up to us to try and bring home to the Higher
Direction the possible effects of trying to do two things at once; i.e.,
break through in France and break through here. We are to stand aside
for a month or so just when we have made a big gain of ground but not
the decisive watershed gain; when the Turks, despite their losses in
life, shell, trenches and terrain, are shaken only; not yet shattered.

K. sees all the Allied cards--we don't. But we do know our own hand. We
know that our Navy have now come clean down on the AEgean side of the
fence, and have determined once for all to make no attack on their own.
We have the _feel_ of the situation in our bones and it was up to us--I
_think_ it was--to rub it in that although the British War Direction may
decree that the Dardanelles are to hang on without further help,
indefinitely, yet sickness is not yet under their high command, nor are
the Turks.

So Dawnay, who is making a name for himself as a master of plain
business diction, was told off to draft me an answer to the War Office
which should remove as many beams as possible out of their optics. He
overdid it: the whole tone of it indeed was despondent, so much so that,
as I told Braithwaite, a S. of S. for War getting so dark a presentment
of our prospects would be bound to begin to think it might be better to
recall the whole expedition. So I rewrote the whole thing myself:--