Have been writing my weekly budget. Part of my letter to K. harks back
to the first Suvla landing, and tries to give him a better notion of the
failure to profit by the enemy's surprise. Not that I have yet got any
very clear conception of the detail myself. No coherent narrative does,
in fact, exist. New troops, new Staff, new Generals, heavy losses, have
resulted in the confusions, gaps and contradictions still obscuring the
story of those first few days.

Now that I am getting more precise news about what fighting there was,
it seems clear that this great mass of young, inexperienced troops
failed simply because their leaders failed to grasp the urgency of the
time problem when they got upon the ground, although, as far as orders
and pen and ink could go, it had been made perfectly clear. But, in face
of the Turk, things wore another and more formidable shape. Had Lord
Bobs been Commander of the 9th Corps; yes, just think of it! How far my
memory carries me back. Every item needed for the rapid advance: water,
ammunition, supplies and mules closely and personally checked and
counter-checked. Once the troops landed a close grip kept on the
advance. At the first sign of a check nothing keeps him from the spot.
The troops see him. In an hour they are up upon the crest.

So far, so good. We had not another Lord Bobs and it would not have been
reasonable of us to expect him. But when I come to the failure of the
21st, where I have a seasoning of Regulars--as well as a commander of
energy--still we do not succeed. This time, no doubt, the enemy were on
the scene in force and had done ten days' digging; the non-success, in
fact, may be traced to the loss of the element of surprise; energy, in
fact, was met by preparation. The battle had to be fought like a
manoeuvre battle and yet the enemy were ready for us, more or less,
and already fairly well entrenched. Since the morning of the 7th the
chances had been rising steadily against us. Still, even so, the lack of
precise detail baffles me almost as much as in the case of the first
Suvla landing.

CHAPTER XVIII

MISUNDERSTANDINGS

_25th August, 1915. Imbros._ Davies left for Helles at mid-day. Was to
have gone with him but heard that Bailloud with Captain Lapruin would
like to see me, so stayed to receive them.

Have got K.'s answer to my cable pointing out the probable results of
his declared intention of sending us no "reinforcements of importance"
during