or two (less one battalion).

"But you should look on the forces in Egypt and your own as a whole,
allowing, of course, for the proper defence of Egypt, when you take the
general situation at the Dardanelles into consideration.

"Do you think the Navy could do anything more than they are already
doing to help the situation? I hear it is thought that they could land
heavy naval 6-inch guns on positions such as those in square 92 M and
other points, and might threaten from Aja Liman the main road of Turkish
supplies between Karna Bili and Solvili (by gunfire from ships) and also
bring a heavy and effective shell fire on the Turkish positions at and
behind Anafarta. There is a cabinet to-morrow."

I would much like to sleep over this cable--so plain seemingly; really
so obscure. At face value, how splendidly it simplifies the Dardanelles
problem! Had I been, all along, as this cable seems to make me, the
C.-in-C. of the Eastern Mediterranean with Maxwell administering my
Egyptian Base, then, humanly speaking, this entry would have been dated
from Constantinople. But am I? I can't believe it even now, with the
words before me. Anyway, whether by my own fault or those of others, one
thing is certain, namely, that up to date there has been
misunderstanding. Now, the Cabinet of to-morrow forces me to send a
momentous wire without too much time to think it over. To clear my brain
let me set down the sequence of facts as they have so far appeared to
me:--

* * * * *

Less than a week ago--20th inst.--K. cables me he is sending certain
units to Egypt and certain other units to the Dardanelles. The units and
their ships are named. He says there is going to be a big push in
France and that I must look to these troops, earmarked for the
Dardanelles, plus any I "can obtain from Egypt" to carry on. He winds up
by saying, "It is hoped the troops going to Egypt will enable Maxwell to
send you more fighting men on your demand."

This same assumption that the G.O.C., Egypt, and myself are two equals
each having equal command over his own troops, is fully borne out by
another cable of the 21st August. My cable of 23rd August is based on
these messages; i.e. on the idea that we must carry on here for a good
long time to come with very little to help us. Then comes K.'s of the
25th telling me he is sorry 47,000 drafts and reinforcements he has sent
to Maxwell and myself since 6th August are not going to