race by a definite understanding being arrived at with Bulgaria, I
calculate they might gather a total of five divisions but of these
probably only one or at most two would be on Asiatic side at beginning
of the operations and would probably be scattered so that opposition in
strength to surprise landing is improbable. Moreover, only one of the
divisions is composed of good Nizam troops, others believed to be not up
to establishment. The Asiatic coast down to Yukeri Bay is now heavily
trenched but I do not think much has been done below that point.
Supposing, therefore, French bring good divisions at war strength and
succeed in keeping their destination secret, they appear to have a good
chance of obtaining good covering positions without much loss and of
thence advancing on Chanak defeating any Turkish forces sent against
them. Degree of their success would depend on whether the entrenched
positions which have been prepared on the Kum Kale--Ehren Keui road
could be turned by the good road which leads from Yukeri through Ezine
and Ishiklar to Chanak, as it is unlikely that Turks would be able to
quickly organize new defensive positions with entirely new line of
supply. The distance of landing place from objective is a secondary
consideration. It is easier to march and fight 100 miles than to take
three lines of trenches. In the one case there is room for manoeuvre
at which Turks are bad while in the other case siege warfare results at
which the Turks stand supreme. Once Ehren Keui reached, the Turks
between that place and Kum Kale would be forced to retire and Kum Kale
would become our base, thereby greatly shortening line of supply.
Supposing Turks endeavoured to make bridgehead on Chanak promontory, the
country is so big that large forces would be necessary and once the
Turks were cut off from North their supply difficulties would be most
serious. French possession of Chanak should be equivalent to victory,
but as Turks are stubborn fellows it is better to confine anticipations
to commencement of results which I consider would be as
follows:--Cutting off of Turkish supply line Chanak to Akbashi Liman.
Narrows would be useless to Turks. Nagara communications could be cut.
Our 15-inch howitzer could be used to batter Kilid Bahr forts. Allied
Fleets should be able to enter Marmora without loss.
"Turning to alternatives. If French were held up and unable to reach
Chanak, at least the last Turkish reserves would have been
|