equately verified, or in the erection of fanciful
hypotheses, as the starting points of reasoning for the purpose of
establishing other Facts. The second and most common operation referred
to this Method, which is, however, strictly speaking, an imperfect
application of the Inductive Method, is _to draw conclusions from Facts
which these do not warrant_--sometimes conclusions not related to the
Facts, oftener those which, being so related, are a step beyond the
legitimate inferences which the Facts authorize, though in the same
direction. This results in the establishment of Laws or Principles as
true, which are by no means proven, many of which are subsequently found
to be incorrect. It is to this operation of the Hypothetical Method that
Professor Whewell, who does not discriminate the two, refers when he
describes the defect in the physical speculations of the Greek
philosophers to have been, 'that though they had in their possession
Facts and Ideas, _the Ideas were not distinct and appropriate to the
Facts_.' The main cause of defect in the mental process here employed is
the tendency of the human mind to generalize at too early a stage of the
investigation, and consequently upon a too narrow basis of Facts.

This Method characterized the intellectual activity of the race from the
earliest beginnings of thought up to a period which is commonly said to
have commenced with the publication of the _Novum Organum_ of Lord
Bacon. It was of course fruitless of _Scientific_ results, as it was not
a Scientific, but an absolutely Unscientific Method, since _certainty_
is the basis of all Science, and since a Method which attempts to deduce
Facts from Principles which are not ascertained to be Principles, or
Principles from an insufficient accumulation of Facts, cannot insure
certainty.

It is common to aver that the Anticipative or Hypothetical Method failed
to secure distinct and established verities, and thus to answer the
purpose of a guide to knowledge, because it neglected Facts, disregarded
experience, and endeavored to spin philosophy out of the unverified
thoughts of men. Professor Whewell, in the two able and valuable works
to which we have referred, has shown that this was not the case among
the Greeks, at least, whose Philosophy 'did, in its opinions, recognize
the necessity and paramount value of observation; did, in its origin,
proceed upon observed Facts, and did employ itself to no small extent in
classifying