d, thus joining her northern and southern colonies in North
America.

Before going on again with the general course of the history of the
times, it will be well to consider for a moment the theory which
worked so disastrously for England in 1667; that, namely, of
maintaining a sea-war mainly by preying upon the enemy's commerce.
This plan, which involves only the maintenance of a few swift cruisers
and can be backed by the spirit of greed in a nation, fitting out
privateers without direct expense to the State, possesses the specious
attractions which economy always presents. The great injury done to
the wealth and prosperity of the enemy is also undeniable; and
although to some extent his merchant-ships can shelter themselves
ignobly under a foreign flag while the war lasts, this _guerre de
course_, as the French call it, this commerce-destroying, to use our
own phrase, must, if in itself successful, greatly embarrass the
foreign government and distress its people. Such a war, however,
cannot stand alone; it must be _supported_, to use the military
phrase; unsubstantial and evanescent in itself, it cannot reach far
from its base. That base must be either home ports, or else some solid
outpost of the national power, on the shore or the sea; a distant
dependency or a powerful fleet. Failing such support, the cruiser can
only dash out hurriedly a short distance from home, and its blows,
though painful, cannot be fatal. It was not the policy of 1667, but
Cromwell's powerful fleets of ships-of-the-line in 1652, that shut
the Dutch merchantmen in their ports and caused the grass to grow in
the streets of Amsterdam. When, instructed by the suffering of that
time, the Dutch kept large fleets afloat through two exhausting wars,
though their commerce suffered greatly, they bore up the burden of the
strife against England and France united. Forty years later, Louis
XIV. was driven, by exhaustion, to the policy adopted by Charles II.
through parsimony. Then were the days of the great French privateers,
Jean Bart, Forbin, Duguay-Trouin, Du Casse, and others. The regular
fleets of the French navy were practically withdrawn from the ocean
during the great War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1712). The French
naval historian says:--

"Unable to renew the naval armaments, Louis XIV. increased the
number of cruisers upon the more frequented seas, especially the
Channel and the German Ocean [not far from home, it will be